December 28th, 2015 at the Center for Naval Analysis with Ralph Espach

ES: Ralph, thank you very much for accepting (the request for) the interview. As I told you before, this is a strictly academic research and once I put it on paper I will send it to you. If you say OK I will quote you. And if there is any problem I can keep it... How can I say it? Not quote you in the papers if you don't want to. It's ok for me.

RS: I can be quoted with my approval.

ES: Thank you very much. I have three sets of questions and we can talk throughout this. First it is about your profile as a researcher of a think tank. Some of the questions we have already talked about in the previous meeting, but I need to record it. Could you tell me a little bit about your undergraduate and graduate studies? Where did you get it, in which subjects and in what year?

RS: Sure. I took my undergraduate at Columbia University in New York and I graduated in 1992 with a major in American literature and Latin American literature. And then I perceived a Masters in International Affairs from the George Washington University, the Elliot School at GWU in 1999, I believe. Then I moved a few years later to Berkeley and received my PhD in Political Science in 2006. And that was the focus on political economics.

ES: The same year I got my PhD too.

RS: '06? It was a great year.

ES: Do you have governmental experience? Have you worked directly for the government before joining the CNA?

RS: Not strictly speaking. Although, when I worked for the Woodrow Wilson Center... that's a federally funded think tank. They receive a portion of their money through federal funds. So, strictly speaking I was a federal employee. Also, I guess we could say the CNA is a think tank that does a lot of close work with the Navy, the RAND Corp. and the Defense Department, although I am certainly not a government employee, or a employee of the Navy. the RAND Corp or the Defense Department. We work pretty close to them.

ES: And in the academic world, have you worked in a university before?

RS: Have I taught?

ES: Or as researcher for... otherwise as a student.

RS: I worked at a research center at Berkeley when I was a student there. I taught at Berkeley and then I taught at Seattle University. And that's it.

ES: And at private corporations?

RS: The only private corporation, for which I have worked for, that I can recall, is the World Economic Development Congress, before I moved to Washington and New York for a few years. They put on international business meetings, conferences.

ES: How long have you been working here at CNA?

RS: For about eight years.

ES: Do you consider yourself as a conservative, a centrist or a liberal in the American ideological and political spectrum?

RS: I consider myself a centrist.

ES: How did you become an expert in Latin America or Brazil issues?

RS: My interest in Latin America came through learning Spanish and through studying Latin American literature, and then living in Central America for about a year and half after my college. At that point I was introduced to politics and economics by always arguing with Central Americans about how bad the United States was.

ES: In the nineties?

RS: In 1992 and 1993, so after the first Iraq war.

ES: And while the peace process was on going in Nicaragua, El Salvador...

RS: They were under negotiation. The war was over and the political process was unfolding. I didn't visit Nicaragua or El Salvador. I am not of the generation that was active in Central America academically or as a professional, because that's important. I became attracted to learning more about the politics and the economics. I went back and I did a Master’s degree and then worked at the Wilson Center. And that's where I worked much more on US and Latin America international affairs and studied Latin America more seriously, in terms of politics and economics. I think it's important personally... with a literature background, I am a little more disposed to think of arguments in terms of theories and narratives than people who were always economists or political scientists. At Wilsons I learned Portuguese and I worked on the Brazil program, when it was just getting started in the Wilson Center. I learned a lot about Brazil. I traveled to Brazil. That's when my sister started dating a Brazilian and so I had personal reasons to go there a couple times. Then I worked on Latin America throughout my graduate work. I helped publish a couple of books on trade dynamics and international dynamics. And here my job is chief of Latin American political and military area for the Strategic Studies.

ES: This is a very interesting trajectory from literature to politics and international affairs.

RS: And then to security. I have been doing only security for the last eight years.

ES: You said you lived in Brazil for a while, for about 6 months?

RS: I lived there for 6 months and a half during my gradute work. I've been there a couple of times. Once, for a month long period pre-testing my graduate thesis. And before that I had gone to three carnivals and took a number of weeks off in Rio and things like that.

ES: Have you traveled to many regions or kept in Rio, São Paulo?

RS: Mostly Sao Paulo Brasilia and Rio. But my wife and I had our honeymoon in Brazil and we traveled to Salvador, Paraty, Campo Grande, Bonito. We have kind of been around, not Amazonas and not down to the South, unfortunately. But I will get there.

ES: Sure you will. Probably the next ABED meeting will be in Santa Catarina, in Florianópolis, in the South. Probably. How do you get your sources to write about Brazil in your work here at CNA? Which kinds of sources you usually gather to work on your researches about Brazil? Is it press? Other think tanks?

RS: It depends on the piece because working in Washington is different from working on an academic center in a university. Some things you write you want to be short and very timely. And in that sense it is often just from the press. More in general, my ideas and the deeper information and the more valuable information for the American audience comes out of reading articles in Portuguese from people like yourself, who write about US and Brazil relations and Brazilian strategic thinking, and are typically published in Portuguese. And a lot of it, as far as I know, is not translated into English. So, Política Exterior. I’ll “google” topics in Portuguese and then look for people whose names I know and centers like CEBRI, IPEA and kind of dig it. Or I ask people like you or Ricardo Sennes and some of my friends "What has been writing on this recently? What are the good pieces on this?". Not very a methodological, not a very systematic approach. I think most bilateral relationships… My advantage is not that any more than anyone else. If I have any advantages, it is I am a little more experienced than a lot of people. Not as much experienced as some people but I can read in Portuguese and I can keep up with the people who write about it.

ES: And governmental speeches, reports, this kind of stuff. Do you usually use it for your work? Or do you work more with the academic literature?

RS: I work more with the academic literature because I'm usually a little more interested in the structure, a little more interested in the patterns and the trajectories… in analysis of what is being said, rather than what is being said.  Although some people like presidential speeches a little bit. But to my notion in Brazil, like in the United States… Foreign policy regarding the United States is not often the focus of politicians’ speeches. It is not that important to the Brazilian public. But anything by Celso Amorim… He gave a speech… I tried to get a hold of it because I think it was an influential and important thinker. Celso Lafer, this kind of people… I look for their names and see what interesting people are saying.

ES: Do you think Brazil is more a Latin American country, a BRICS country or a global one?

RS: A Latin American country.

ES: Why?

RS: Mostly by discarding the other options.  In the sense that very few countries are a global country. There are very few… maybe the United States can be called a global country. There isn't a lot places where the United States doesn't do much. So it is very difficult to be a global country and there are very few of them. And BRICS is a grouping that I think it is still uncertain what it means, what its influences are. I don't believe it is assured to exist in 10 years. The BRICS may prove to be an ephemeral association among countries during high commodities prices when all four countries had short interest in bonding together. But that may not hold over a long period of time.  We will see it in 15 years if the BRICS is still interesting or even exists as a group of countries. So it is a Latin American country in many aspects. Brazil is in Latin America, shares a lot of the problems that Latin American countries have. It shares a lot of the geographic and strategic characteristics with those countries. And in many ways it is different but generally… If I had to choose, if I had to characterize it, I would say it may be 5 to 10% global country, 10% BRICS country and the rest of Latin America.

ES: In the last few years a lot of people were talking about Brazil as a rising country. Is such a rise an opportunity to the United States? Why?

RS: We can return to the question of whether Brazil still looks like a rising country. A year or two years ago that was a very relevant question. That was how Brazil was being cast in Washington. Brazil was a rising country for all for all the reasons [14:26], the economic vitality and the good programs. And now with the recession, which may be a depression, and [14:35] problems and the slumping of the region as a whole it looks less as a sure bet that Brazil is where are you want to invest your money. People now are not so interested in investing their money in Brazil. Politically, it looks like it is going through a rough patch and we will see what comes out. So I'm not sure that people are looking to Brazil in the way they were two or three years ago. That said, it is an important country and it could have greater influence outside... It could have greater influence within Latin America in some point, within South America where it already has some influence. And it could have global, or at least extra regional, influence and activities. And that does open up an opportunity, not for the United States, but... The United States sees itself generally, and I am characterizing the Obama administration… But I think a lot of centrist positions, a lot of centrist views on US foreign policy is that... and by centrist I would include many Republicans, many conservatives... the United States, its security and its interests are best secured when there is an international liberal order that functions, in which constitutional democracies that respect human and political rights to some degree most of the time collaborate and cooperate under the rule of law. And that can be negotiated, those rules of law. That said, Brazil seeking its interests and pursuing its self-interests in places like Africa, the Mediterranean and the Middle East… Brazil is a constitutional democracy. Brazil is over 50% committed to the rule of law. Brazil is a law-abiding international actor and it operates through the United Nations and through the WTO [16:35]. It is certainly a participatory and it could be a greater contributing country in the future in those forums and in that system. And to the extent that Brazil operates within that system, its expression and its interests are very likely to align more or less in the greater [16:55] with the United States. Like France, or the United Kingdom, or Canada or Australia. those countries don't have interest that are 100% compatible with our interest. And we fight over a lot of thing, we dispute… We don't always collaborate on everything. But in general the help of those country, and I would call them allies… they have similar values. The help and the strength of those countries, and their activity abroad, is in line with our greater interests. So, yes, it is an opportunity. And that is the argument that most people in Washington generally share about Brazil. And the concern is "will Brazil be able to be a greater actor abroad?". I don't think there is a great concern, even in the years when Lula made its comments about blue eyes devils and things like that... Anyone knows Brazil well enough today and has been to Brazil enough, and has enough communication and understanding. There was never a concern that Brazil was actively [18:07] our interest in any way. In the way that the Chavez and Maduro governments have tried actively to [18:14] interest from time to time. Or Daniel Ortega sometimes [18:18] our interest when he was not trying to get our money and be friends. Brazil is never seen as a problematic intentional adversary.

ES: So eventually a Brazilian rise, you believe, is not a challenge to the United States?

RS: No. We can imagine some scenarios… And there is some probability, some risk that a Brazilian rise would be a rise of an anti-democratic, autocratic country. But it is very difficult to me to see that happening during my lifetime. I could be wrong but the way characterized Brazil's rise as a democracy, more or less similar to the form of today… With its activism within the United Nations, within the WTO, and potentially within BRICS and in international organizations that complement the international order… That is positive for the United States. I'm not a declinist. I think the United States is going to be the most influential power for the next 50 years. Unless we commit suicide, unless we destroy all of our friendships we will probably be a major power. I tend to agree with George Bush in his second term and Obama's second term. We just can't do what America tends to think we can do. We don't have the influence everywhere in the globe. We have less influence than we used to. And other countries obviously, like China, have greater influence. And to get things done, we have to be a better diplomatic actor and have more partners and better leverage in cooperating and supporting our aligned friends, and countries that share our values, like Brazil.

ES: Do you believe we are in a transition to a multipolar international order?

RS: No. 

ES: What kind of order?

RS: Well, that is a good question. I think it depends on what is meant by multipolar and what is meant by order. In terms of the national influence I think there is a good probability, though not assured, that China is going to continue to gain influence mostly through the power of its market, its economic weight and its power to invest abroad. Obviously, I think Saudi Arabia and some countries that are becoming more active then they use to be, even outside of their regions, and are more expressive in their foreign policy then they used to be… Partially because, I think, the United States is doing less for them.  And that makes for a more complex, or at least more active and dynamic, international situation. In terms of order, however... Outside of China and India, maybe Brazil... We will talk more about whether Brazil is going to become a global power or not. Brazil has many reasons why… It doesn’t seem to incline to be a global power for some good reasons. But even in places like China or India, which are much larger and which have all that global market demand weight behind their demographic strength, they have a lot of challenges that they face domestically. If they are going to become and sustain influence abroad, one of the problems each of those countries have is demographics. They face demographic challenges of taking advantage of that window and they do have this working population that can still support their ageing population… But their ageing population is ageing quickly and they don't have the migration. China certainly doesn’t have the population increase that India has to sustain its demographic profile that will support long-term growth in the way the United States luckily has... Our tendency is to be a very immigration rich country. Those countries have a lot of problem. It is not a 90% chance China is going to be the largest most powerful country in 50 years. I think it is a 50% chance. But it will be an important country.  And a lot of Asian countries are growing much faster and gaining not only economic weight to their markets, but also sophistication in their products and in their companies. The US is in relative decline. In my lifetime it is not going to go back to 1950 or the 60's, when the United States did dominate in many economic and strategic sectors. But a multipolar order seems to me... There is a difference between the normative order, or the structure, and the relative power among countries. I tend to think that the most likely scenario in the next 20 or 50 years is a continuation of the order, more or less, as it accommodates a shifting balance among the powers. Because the capitalist democratic system, at least in the United States and Europe, has been one of slow accommodation of interests that were not originally included. From women to black people in the United States, to labor interests. All this interests that were in conflict. And there were times when the capitalist democratic political system of the United States was going to collapse because of the conflicts and tensions and there was violence on the streets, of course. When that occurred, the system was able to accommodate itself and to let in new actor, and coopt groups and to mobilize them within the party system and things like that. That suggests that in the international it will be much more expensive, costly and risky for countries like China, India and Brazil to think about waging a war or trying to destroy the current system in order to rebuild a new system that fits their interests than it is to push, argue and fight, from time to time, in the small, contained conflicts so the system accommodates them. I think that is the most likely evolution over the next few decades.

ES: I believe this is the Brazilian strategy, to try to get more space in the order, not against the order. 

RS: Maybe I've been reading too much many Brazilian strategy analysts like yourself and Celso Amorim. So I have internalized it. I think that is a good strategy. I have written before. If you think of the rise of the United States… The United States rose domestically and then the First and Second Word Wars, the turmoil in Europe and the breakdown of the European system, the collapse of the peace concert of Europe, in the greater scheme, pushed the United States into great power hood. It wasn't before the end Second World War that we embraced the fact that all the major industrialized democracies destroyed themselves in that war. And we, by mostly virtue of geography, had emerged as the sole standing superpower. We didn't seek that. I mean some people… Teddy Roosevelt, in 1898, he thought “Maybe we can reach it”, but it was generally against the public interest. The public was isolationist. So it took a major world war and the collapse of everyone else for the United States to step up and then help our European allies mostly to rebuild that order. So if you want to play the game of imagining a scenario where Brazil will rise more quickly or have an opportunity like that, then a war between the United States and China, if such a thing where to play out and were to be terribly destructive, then Brazil would look like... Brazil and Australia... Australia is a very small country, so it's hard to say but it has some advantage, but just as examples. Brazil is the type of country that is an exporter of a diverse set of products, from minerals to food and industry. They could emerge of that kind of scenario ready to sell everything they have to the world and grow very quickly in a world where the two major powers have destroyed themselves. That is an interesting scenario for Brazil to think of, but hard to prepare for that. And I think the probability of that occurring is relatively low, but it's not zero.

ES: Brazil played this kind of game in the Second World War, playing with the US and Germany. Not only Germany, but also Italy in the late thirties and early forties. But it made an alliance with the United States. People in Argentina say "Brazil always make the good choices and Argentina always make the bad ones". In World War Two, Argentina was against the United States up to the end of the war and Brazil made an alliance. And in the Second Cold War, in the eighties, Brazil became distant from the United States in Central America and all these scenarios. And Argentina sent troops to the counter-insurgency in Central America, and you have Malvinas... They say Brazil played the best diplomatic game and Argentina just the opposite. Argentinians say that, not me. There is a very confrontational and polarized political system in Argentina. It is very hard to play politics and do foreign policy.

RS: Or even run a coherent political economy.

ES: Well, they are no longer the second economy in South America. Colombia is a country in civil war and is going better than them. I have many friends in Argentina, academics, and it is impressive the hard work they do, their conditions of work, the lack of money for research, to travel... but let's come back.

RS: I think the rise of Argentina as a major global is even less likely than Brazil's.

ES: For sure.

RS: But it is not zero. Argentina has wonderful natural resources, a lot like Brazil, as we were just saying, and much of South America. And in the end of scenario where everyone else's collapses, or engage in war, United States [30:30] itself in by more crazy neoconservatives, wars abroad or to solve problems. If United States declines tremendously, and becomes a global pariah then places like Argentina and Brazil will have, relatively speaking, a lot of space to move into. And they are less likely be touched by problems of conflicts like other regions, like the East Pacific. The good news for the people living in the East Pacific is that if the current system continues and the current economic order evolves, they will likely be the center of it. They are likely to prosper and become very influential and live better lives. On the other hand, because of that reason, they're likely to be a... if [31:30] to conflict, they going to be in the front lines. The advantage of Chile and Argentina is that they are never on the front line. On the other hand, they are more stable and can not be afraid of the same scenario of conquest that those other countries from the East Pacific worry about.

ES: That is an advantage for geography, to be far away.... Well, in your opinion, what is and what could be the role played by Brazil in South America? In the diplomatic and political realms?

RS: That is difficult for me to answer because I am not a South American. My perception is that there is a striking cynicism about Brazil in the other countries of South America that I know. Colombia, Peru, Chile, Mexico. Brazil needs to overcome a narrative...  in the same way we have to overcome a narrative of intervention, and covered operations by the CIA determining everything in South America kind of notion. The narrative about Brazil is that they don't really care about Latin America. Brazilians aren't prepared nor committed to do much within Latin America, except at the political dialogue level, working arrangements through presidents. And if it wasn't for the Brazilian money, for its massive market and its massive stock market, and some of the companies that are world-class companies... the Brazilian government sector isn't any better prepared for leadership of South America than any other government down there.  And of course all the government, Chileans think they are better prepared and have more coherent foreign policy than the Brazilians do. So there is a lot of cynicism. I think Brazil could certainly play a more cooperative role but it would need to invest in that, it would need to put money into that. And it needs to build up the tools to do so. There is a narrative about the investment on the part of the BNDES in other countries. At the peak of the enthusiasm of Brazil is original power in 2008, 2009, 2010... Even at that time there was criticism about how little those investment were contributing for the growth of these other countries and how little the infrastructure project outside of, maybe a couple in Argentina, are really making a difference. And of course China was moving in at the same time with a lot more money and Venezuela was it spending a lot of money at that time. So Brazil was not even in a powerful position, relatively speaking, that point. Even if the United States wasn't as involved... Europe and the United States were not nearly as important players as they used to be. And now, I assume, with the economic situation of Brazil and with a lot of political turbulence, no matter what happens in the next few months, the next couple of years are going to be politically turbulent and it has to be focused in Brazil internally. I think it is a long way off before Brazil is seen as a leader, other than being a big country. It is a big country so it is naturally influential in some way. But it is not an assertive country. And in some respects that is good because this is good because if it were more assertive it would have more resistance, as the United States knows very well. When you are assertive you can win friends, when you are assertive and aligned with their interest, but you also create enemies that you didn't have before. So I think this may be a calculated decision on Brazil's part. Historically, Rio Branco and such thought it was better not to get involved in neighbors problems because that creates more problems. As long as they are stable you don't bother. There is wisdom in maintaining a relatively peaceful region, but it won't develop the region, it won't develop Brazil into a more influential actor.

ES: What about the role in the South Atlantic security? That Brazil plays or you think it would or could play?

PS: In South Atlantic security?

ES: Yes.

PS: My response is similar in the sense that other countries can look to Brazil as a potential leader because Brazil has more resources to dedicate. And Brazil is investing in important programs through its Navy, security sector, that would boost its influence in the region. And Brazil's trade and economic, diplomatic, cultural, scientific relations with Africa are well known and are growing. Those are all important and provide the basis for the growing relationships. Now that said, is Brazil likely to sustain the kind of investment it needs economically, industrially and in terms of infrastructure, to build a Navy, an Air Force, police services and intelligence services that can actually provide security over a massive area effectively? And then will it use its influence, whatever influence it has, to try to leverage, [37:42], convince and win over resistance and cynical partners? I haven't been to Argentina in eight or ten years or have I spoken with Argentinians in depth about their relations with Brazil, so I don't know, But my sense is Argentina will be [37:58] a Brazilian led South Atlantic security system. And certainly the African countries... the experience of the United States dealing with cooperative security in West Africa is that they take and take anything you want, and are happy to cooperate in any way that means you give them the money and you give them things and then very little in terms of indigenous capacity comes out of it. So it is very difficult to create that and to see it coming to effect in ways that aren't tainted by corruption or by lack of the sustainment. So, the boats, the capabilities, and the equipment that are given a year later aren't in operation. They have been wrecked, they have been lost, their parts are broken and haven't been replaced. So it is very difficult to get a commitment. And to do so sometimes you need leverage. You need a lot of resources and to sustain efforts. And in West Africa the United States haven't been able to win that. By the way, France and the UK have been also providing security assistance and cooperation for decades. And they would say... At least to my ears, what I have heard (is that) they are always trying to do better because there is always a little dissatisfied with the results. It is interesting for Brazil to get involved in the game. And again I think it is aligned with the interests of the US, France and these kinds of countries, so there isn't a resistance to it. Brazil has made a lot of [39:35] in certain countries, in Portuguese speaking countries. But I am skeptical Brazil has the money and the commitment to actually do things for ten, twenty years that build relations slowly, build investments and then sustain them. The South Atlantic is an interesting area because one of the attractiveness of it to Brazil is that it is empty, it is largely empty. And so it is not central to United States interests, the Russian interest, or Chinese interests. It is not central to the big powers' interests. It isn't a [40:26] area where Brazil has [40:28] space, I think. That is part of the intelligence behind committing to that area. In terms of learning your lesson in a region like that, before engaging too deeply in the Mediterranean or the Middle East and much more contentious, complex and dynamic areas where people countries have a lot more money and commitment and capacity for lethal action as they do in West Africa, it is a good idea. It is a good testing ground. And so that is a positive but all that commitment that I was describing requires investment and commitment for a very small payoff. For Brazil to be known as a leader of cooperative group of countries that is more effective in securing safety, and in some trafficking issues, in East and West of the South Atlantic... that is a very little pay off. It is not like it is going to be a celebrated global power because it has a greater maritime security presence in the South Atlantic along with its partners like South Africa. And that is interesting because it looks attractive because no one is going to stop you and there is general support in this, but at the same time it doesn't have the immediate payoff which is why Russia, France are both investing... They are showing their naval might, their presence and their influence the Mediterranean.

ES: However we have the British Navy operating in the South Atlantic.

RS: Only for one reason. That is a detriment to the strategy because somehow that would need to be resolved. And I don't think Brazil any more than the United States wants that resolved... It is going to be a painful resolution on either side. If it could just go away, it would be of everyone's interest but that of course is not going away. For Brazil to take a command position, if it were to do so in that area it would need... It will inherit a command position in resolving that, one way or the other. That would be a great opportunity for Washington if Brasilia could negotiate some kind peaceful, satisfying agreement between the UK and Argentina.

ES: But after they found oil in the shore of the Falklands/Malvinas, it is very hard for the UK to give up the current arrangement. The new government in Argentina may be a little more flexible with the Malvinas issue, but it is a very sensitive issue for the public.

RS: My impression is that it is extremely sensitive for the British as well. I have British friend and I've never seen them be... My British friends then to be very rational, especially in international affairs, as a former great power which has now to negotiate with all these other powers to get anything it wants. They are aware of that, and so they are very pragmatic, practical and full of humor. When it comes to the Falkland Islands, I have seen them become completely nationalistic and definitively angry and ready to go to the Falklands at any time. That was a shock to me how committed they seem to feel to the British citizens who live in the Falkland islands. For me there is no dispute that the residents of the Falklands want to be British more than they want to be Argentinian. That could change. It would be a lot easier if that changed. It is like the Senkakus or these relatively minor points that become large in the national narrative and in the national mind. So it is difficult to see any accommodating governments winning public support, either in Argentina or the UK, for a radical change in their position there. I don't think it is the oil. With the oil prices being what they are today I doubted that oil is going to be developed. Oil is being developed today all over the United States in the lot of people are not drilling their oil because it is not worth it.

ES: But in the future it will probably arise again.

RS: Probably.

ES: Thinking in terms of decade it certainly will.

RS: When they rise again, there are major deposits all across Venezuela, Mexico, Brazil that will become affordable again.

ES: And what about the role played, or that Brazil could play in the global governance? In the World Trade Organization, climate change?

RS: I think Brazil plays a positive and active role in those. That is a strong point for Brazil. In those fora it can play a role as a bridge between communities of countries with different interests.

ES: So, you believe Brazil can play this role of a bridge between different kinds of countries in these fora.

RS: A bridge implies that there are two groups of countries that are somehow in two opposite ends of body of water. That may be a too powerful metaphor. In the global negotiations, whether it is in the UN or the WTO, in these multinational fora, as we have seen in Paris, success is a very difficult, arduous game of [47:05], convincing and diplomacy among multiple coalitions of countries. I don't think Brazil is unique in its ability to speak with African countries, the Middle East countries as well as Europe, the United States and China. I don't think it is unique in that row but I think it can be very positive in that role. In the way a lot of middle powers, the Swedish, the Swiss, the countries that maintain a certain neutrality among the major blocs over the decades have that sort of a role to play. I think it is arguable whether, thinking about it in a rational choice structure sense, a country comes out with more leverage in getting more of its national interest as being a bridge between two big blocs that are negotiating between each other. You can play that role or be a minor member of one of those blocs. Like Israel, that has a lot of influence in Washington and can work its interests through this major bloc in which Washington is the key player and the key negotiator. They tend to do well too when they play that game. So I don't know if bridging is the best strategy, necessarily. But I think Brazil can play that role as well as a lot of other countries and, of course, better than Beijing or Washington, which tend to be the determinants of the game.

ES: Brazil's foreign policy has some core value like sovereignty, non-intervention, quest for autonomy, whose understanding is very different from those of the United States. Do you think these differences make relations with the United States difficult to flow?

RS: Yes, very much so. I think this is... If you are asking about reasons why the United States and Brazil relations are complicated, this would be a big one. I think the United States is more the outlier along those terms... I guess that is irrelevant. The international activity of the United States and many of its aligned countries in Europe and in the Anglo-speaking world is professed by the notion that their values, their democratic values are worth fighting for abroad when necessary. I think that the lessons of the 20th century support that. Now, I don't think Brazil specifically disagrees with that, under any circumstances. Brazilians would also... as my understanding, my reading of the diplomatic... some of the speeches and writings of Amorim and Patriota is that "yes, defense of human rights... gross human rights violations and if can stop wars and thing like that... then it is worthwhile". So it is not a difference of core values in that sense. That sovereignty or non-interventionism is the overriding principle, rather than it is a question of standards and criteria for making a decision of when it is acceptable. And for Brazil, it seems to me, it's a question of how much broader, multinational support can be brought to bare. And if it isn't nearly consensus in the world that something must be done in military scale than you shouldn't do anything. Because you need consensus. The consensus, or near-consensus, which seems to dominate South American politics, is something that the United States today, since its rise as a great power naturally, finds [51:46]. The United States want to build a coalition and if it can (sic) it would like consensus. It would like near consensus on what it needs to do, or what it sees as its interest [51:57]. George Bush Senior did it before the first Iraq War. He worked very hard to bring many countries into the coalition and to minimize opposition. And he was successful doing it, partially because Saddam Hussein was very unsuccessful in making any justification for its actions. The United States can appreciate... when it can it should go consensus. Some people in the United States, with whom I disagree, find that completely (unnecessary): "There is no need for consensus". But I think those don't represent the common wisdom and what is most likely to happen in the most cases. What the United States finds as a problem in Brazil's emphasis in these normative values of sovereignty and nonintervention is that it can, of course, take months and years to reach such consensus. As we see in South America all the time. It is a fact of political action that a large consensus takes time to build and it is inefficient in somethings. Let's say the United States is less patient, and other countries as well. I think of France... This happens time and time again: the countries that are more patient than others in waiting for things to evolve. But part of Brazil's patience, it seems to me, has to do with the fact that most of the international problems that require an urgent military response, an interventionist response tend not to be happening in Brazil's backyard. So it is relatively easy from our perspective. Again, because we are a global power. It is happening in our backyard either. So this is why there is an isolationism [50:50]. There is a persistent and not insignificant percentage of Americans who always want to have nothing to do with the Middle East, and nothing to do with Africa, and maybe something to do with Europe just because we feel like we are an extension of Europe. But Asia... let those places sort out their own problems. There is a strong [54:12]. But it hasn't won since FTR, basically. So I think it is more a matter of differences in patience and the sense of urgency of the problem. Criticizing the United States for being reactionary and overly unilateralist... but I think sometimes they fail to appreciate... not during the Bush years. I think people were being grossly misled into the unilateralism of George W. Bush's first term. But in Asia, today, such as in the South China sea and this kind of contentious areas... What I think Brazilians and South Americans in general fail to understand, unless they have lived in Washington a bit and talked to Americans about these things, is that the United States is responding all the time to allies and partners who want an aggressive and assertive United States. Think of Israel. Every region has its Israel. Colombia, right? Countries that are close partners, has [55:31] and says "If I am your close partner, Washington, then you should do something for me. And what I need done is my national security on this, and this and this. And If I'm not your regional partner, if you are not going to do this things for me, than I need to find someone who will". That is the card these countries play all the time. And the United States can't afford to lose regional partners.

ES: So, reverse leverage...

RS: Sure. Absolutely. And it is not an overwhelming leverage, obviously. Even Israel, at least in this administration, does not get everything it wants. And a lot of countries get very little of what they want. Like the Colombians. But they get somethings. And we can't afford... Washington cannot afford neglect those relationships. What happens sometimes is, I think... The language that comes out of US politicians and comes out of the Defense Department, comes out of the State Department, in guidance, at least publically, and in speeches that is designed to help the Japanese, for example, the Philippines, and the Thais, and the Vietnamese... (They) feel more comfortable with the notion that the United States is not going to abandon them if China is assertive. That language that is aimed at calming, [56:50] those fears sounds assertive and aggressive in South America. And the argument made by some people in Washington, as those speeches and as that language is determinant to the bureaucratic process... People would come in from time to time and say "Listen, Brazil won't like the way it sounds. South Africa won't like the way it sounds. India might not like the way it sounds. It sounds too assertive...". Those arguments fail and I think the top people at the State Department and at the National Security Council say "Well, we'll call the Brazilians and tell we don't mean it. And that is fine. But it is more important to us that the Israelis, the Qataris, the Turks... these countries that are really at the fore front of the national interests and national strategic problems right now feel our love and that the South Americans understand us more, other than we shape our language for South American's". The South Americans sort of fail to understand that dimension of the US policy. Because they are focused on their own interests and it sounds quite assertive to them.

ES: This is a very interesting point. Well, do you believe that Brazilian close relations with China would be a problem to the United States?

RS: No.

ES: Why?

RS: Well, again. If Brazil's relation with China are structured within, and manifest itself within free trade, under the rule of law, transparently, through open competition and according to formal agreements and legal structure [59:02] international and national, then it is very much like Brazil's quite serious economic ties with Spain, Denmark, India. What would be a problem and what alarmists in the United States like to point to is if China had the prospect of building ties with Brazil, in this case, economically, politically and then using those ties to build a military base. The Chinese action that is against the US interests. That's the kind of scenario that we don't like. Or that they could use investment in Brazilian telecommunications, Internet infrastructure, that sort of things in order to create a greater capability to destroy our system if they wanted to. That would be a problem. Those things would be very difficult for China to do. If the contracts and the activities were formal and legal, because it would be clearly against Brazil's interest to do that. It would put Brazil as a target of US actions. So that is why I don't think... Personally, I don't think there is any necessary problem in Chinese investments and stronger relations with Brazil or any other South American country. In fact, I think it is the opposite. I think Latin America, South America is an area in which China hasn't invested a great deal and that has evolved a lot. And China is learning that to be effective it must, as the Brits and the US over decades and decades learned, conduct itself in line with local politics and local laws. I say politics and laws because they are not the same thing. So it is a question more of where they are investing and how the politics and the legal system play out in those countries. I think Brazil is the case, like Chile, Colombia, and Mexico, where surely there is an opportunity for corruption. But the opportunity for corruption in the level that China could manipulate the system to its own interests is not there. And I think China has to play by Brazilian rules in the same way we have to. We didn't have to always but we certainly have to today, and I think they do as well.

ES: I've read some documents, official US documents that rise concerns abou the Chinese presence in Latin America and in Brazil.

RS: I don't think everyone shares my lack of concern. But that is because some people interpret Chinese expansion or Chinese investment as a zero-sum game. And that is because there are some Chinese writing as well, there is some thinking in Beijing that Beijing watchers watch in this country and the thinking is similar. They want to be in South America because it gives them leverage over our interests and they could use it at some point against in some way. The [01:02:58] of the matter, as I see it, is if they are investing in countries where there are functioning police and regulatory system and where there is transparency to some extent over those contracts and over what the Chinese, than the Chinese are not able to turn their investments, even their ports, facilities, major railroads and things like that, to Beijing's interest strictly, in a way that would be against those countries' interest without running into a lot of trouble. So, their investments in Chile, in Peru, in relatively well-ordered democracy that have the rule of law, I think, are largely positive and it would be very difficult for China to try to leverage those investments in ways that are against the national interest. And I still believe that unless the United States really collapses economically in the next 20, 25 years, it will be not in any of those countries interests to pose a military or national security problem for the United States. So I do not see that as a problem. I think what you are referring to, and going the argument from Washington, in regard to such cases as Ecuador, Venezuela, potentially Bolivia but I think that is kind of fading in the US consciousness, where the Chinese may be able to manipulate an autocratic system, or a completely opaque system, or a defective government where there is no functioning rule of law... And China can do whatever it wants, can export things illegally and can use that to exercise covered interests. I think history suggests that... if China were to do so: 1. China knows that the United States is watching them closely, is concerned with this. And particularly north of the Equator and everything in the Caribbean basin the United States sees as potentially a first order national security problem. So China would be taking a risk, as the Cubans did and the Russians did with Cuba. They would be taking a great risk to stoke those fires, because those fires are always being watched by the United States. So China would have to want to do that. But equally importantly is that China would also have to calculate how effective could it be in the Venezuelan, just to name an example, today environment of gaining economic leverage or implanting industries there or bases or military cooperation that then it could effectively exercise against the United States. The Venezuelans under the Chavez administration and the Maduro administration... It is almost collapsed as a country. And I think corruption, from what I read... I haven't been there but the intelligence and the public reporting is that the place a complete mess. The Iranians have largely left. The Chinese continue to invest much less than they used to, just to sort of save some hope that their precious investments of 15 or 20 billion dollars can be regained. They run the risk of what has happened with the British, the United States and other powers over the decades of revolutionary new government tearing up all contracts, a new constitution and a [01:06:58] of everything that has been happening over the last 15 years. And then China... What is its leverage within Caracas? Washington has found time and time again... We think we have a lot of leverage in countries that we don't. We don't control events. Even in our history we have invested, as you know... we have intervened consistently in small countries in the Caribbean area over and over again, and the results are very seldom what we want them to be. I think we learned that lesson, I like to think. Before I walk away from that argument... There is an argument that says "We have learned a lesson with the Dominican Republic and Panama in a positive way. We finally learned how to conduct interventions in a softer, more effective manner and leaving behind a greater frame for success". The Granada... the military interventions, aggressive interventions of the 1980's and early 1990's actually worked our [01:08:04] results than the Nicaraguans, the Haiti and such of the 20's, 30's. Those are difficult things to contemplate, as we know now in the Middle East, as we knew now in Central America. Controlling the ultimate evolution of those events is extremely difficult and China may not know that lesson. But I doubt it. And plus the United States are very close. China would not be able to invade Venezuela with a bunch of Marines, try to sort out its finances and make sure it gets repaid, like we used to do. And we and the Europeans used to try to do. It's impossible. Of course the United States would block them. So, all that is to say that for me it is difficult to paint scenarios that are convincing, in which China leverages Latin America in some sort of military, national security sense against the United States.  To the contrary, I think as China invests in Latin America, grows close to Latin America, relies on Latin American exports and investments in some degree... rely is a strong word because China is much larger and they could walk away and find those resources elsewhere. As China's investment grows on a lot of South American governments it is learning to play by the rules of the game, and to be more transparent and not be able to export Chinese labor, for example, to these countries where they have plenty of labor. Those terms are changing over the last ten or fifteen years. That is part of the long term positive process I wish the United States... its great strategic interest for the next 50 years is for China to become closer to a law abiding, cooperative nation.

ES: Engage in the liberal order.

RS: And it is very much engaged. I think in the most part China does play by the rules. And it seems to me quite clear that when China says it doesn’t want to play by the rules entirely is on its borders, in its border areas and border waters. I think ultimately, and I certainly don't speak for the government or the Navy, I'm independent, the United States could live with that if it means keeping the global system going and avoiding conflict with China. And if China does continue to act and to evolve into a country that… It's a great power but it uses that power in cooperation most of the time, or at least not an outright violation of international norms and laws... I think the world is in a much... the world and the United States is in a a much more secure place. I'm reasonably optimistic about that. So China's ties with South America help that process along more than they hurt it, at least for what I have observed in the last decade.

ES: Brazil has been enhancing its military capabilities through several modernization and development programs. You are very aware of that. A second fleet, a nuclear strike submarine, capacity to build fighters, an ongoing space program. In your vision, how does it affect the United States? A more military capable brazil.

RS: Of course it depends on what disposition of the Brazilian government will be. But I assume that the disposition of the Brazilian government will continue to be mostly pacific, law abiding, cooperative power (sic). With that in mind, I think the buildup of military power within Brazil is a... I would almost say it's a overwhelming positive for the United States. It's hard to find negative aspects of that because Brazil with more hard power allows Brazil to play greater roles. [01:03:02] Brazil chooses. You mentioned the South Atlantic. If Brazil chooses to seriously build a South Atlantic cooperative security zone in some way, and again it can convince, buy off and have its partners engaged in that, that is a positive for the United States. Unless that become some sort of group of autocratic countries that want to [01:13:31] international trade. But that is so difficult to imagine that it is almost an unmitigated positive for the United States that Brazil builds up its capabilities. Brazil is already cooperating in many United Nations peacekeeping operations and other operations. This will allow Brazil to do more and better. A stronger military will allow Brazil to respond to problems such as the Haiti earthquake crisis more effectively [01:14:05] more quickly, and play a greater leadership role, or at least a cooperative role, a useful cooperative role in South America. And Brazil is now able to assist or offer assistance to Chile in its most recent earthquake. And Brazil could offer greater, faster logistical support, rescue support than it could before. Those are all positive sides of that military capacity. So I think it is positive. Not to mention that all that modernization and growth is an area of industrial investment and business opportunities, and the United States' companies have unparalleled advantages some those area and long term relationships with Brazil. So it is a good economic opportunity for US companies, but more importantly than that is... I think Brazil is fundamentally a geostrategic partner of the United States. A partner that needs to be accommodated, a partner that has its own demands and that is not completely aligned for sure. But overall it is not a country like Russia, which I think has a proven disposition to violate rules and norms sometimes.

ES: In this scenario you are painting, would you foresee the US navy and the contractors of the US navy helping or collaborating in the development and building of a nuclear powered strike submarine fleet of Brazil? In the technical level, working together.

RS: Yes. I see as a policy matter of the US government. I could see the US government accepting that, for sure. It is difficult because it is Brazil's option whether to have a nuclear fleet or not. But if Brazil chooses to have nuclear weapons, of course that crosses policy lines that would be more difficult regionally than with the United States. Was that what you were talking about?

ES: No. Not nuclear weapons. It is out of question. It is on the constitution. You can't have it. I'm talking about a strike submarine with a (nuclear) powered reactor, like a Los Angeles class submarine. This kind of submarine.

RS: Again it is a policy question. The way that could play out for the United States, to my understanding: US companies would lobby Washington very hard to be able to sign those contracts. And my notion is that Brazilians who are knowledgeable of nuclear submarine technology and systems would want US cooperation because we are the best in the world in that by a long shot. The question is "Would there have to be technology transfer and knowledge transfer that is prohibited by US law?". And if that is the case, as it has been the case recently, it is up to the United States Congress and lobbyists to see if they can change those laws, so you can find loopholes and things like tha5. I can imagine a future in which Brazil uses the submarines it is building now...Submarines are very good for deterrence and if they are loaded with nuclear missiles and missile strike technology they can be good for extended [01:18:17] and forward positioned force. I don't see Brazil doing that. And for other missions, submarines are not useful. Carriers, amphibious ships with helicopters and [01:18:37] are much more useful for a lot of the operations I am describing. I am thinking of potential responses to crisis involving lethal force in West Africa. Imagine Brazil and the South Atlantic community evolving in a positive and effective sense. In fifteen or twenty years, let's say Liberia, because it seems to happen every six years a violent coup in the streets with a lot of civilians in risk etc... The United States up to now has tended to send marines to pull out Americans and other people the US government wants in safety, but Brazil could do that. Brazil can't do that with a submarine. So a nuclear submarine fleet doesn't help for that. If Brazil plays a lead role in some of those operations, proving its contribution to global security and extra regional security in cooperation with international law and under United Nations sponsorship... at that point Brazil would run into situations where something has to be done in West Africa and the United Nations can't decide what to do. The United Nations are going to talk, talk and talk. This is where the United States finds itself time and time again. Brazil would be faced with worldwide wait for months until they are done and do something after [01:20:04] civilians have been killed. You don't wait. So, either the United Sates and someone else is going to do it or the Brazilians are doing it. And at that point Brazil might make a decision "we are going to start doing things without waiting for you" and Brazil's interests would change within the United Nations because it would be a greater power. It would have more influence and more instruments at its disposal. So let's say Brazil starts cooperating more and more in those operations and [01:20:27] Brazil is a recognized participant in international security in a way that is aligned with the interests... I think of all countries, I'm not painting conflicts in there, but disaster response and crisis scenarios... Then a fleet like that... There would be no concerns that Brazil would... There is no concern today with the nuclear submarine that Brazil is building or that it will ever be used against US ships. There is no concern whatsoever in the United States Navy of a threat of a Brazilian submarine. There is no hypothesis of conflict with Brazil. There is no hypothesis of having to enter Brazilian waters for conflict resolutions or anything like that. So, right now, the US navy and US navy contractors would like to be in Brazil helping with those submarines. It would have been great for our contractors to be doing that work instead of the French. But everyone understands that we have different contractual prohibitions or legal prohibitions than the French do. We also understand, we like to think that our work is better than the French. There is a tradeoff there for Brazil. So, in the future i could certainly see that as a possibility: support for Brazilian large modernization... not just in submarines, the SisGAAz and the surface fleet, but also in communication and intelligence. A much more important capability for Brazil to develop in the near term and which is much easier than building ships is intelligence sharing capabilities, intelligence monitoring, gathering and analysis. That is a scenario we could help. A lot of people could help but we could help a great deal. And I think it is very possible. There is a lot of opportunities there. I repeat: people don't look at Brazil as a source of threat whatsoever. People will look to Brazil in the States Department, the diplomats as a source of complication, delay, misunderstanding and frustration. It is commonly stated that there is always an appetite in Washington to cooperate with Brazil and enthusiasm to do so, because on the surface of things we have so much shared values and aligned interests, and Brazil is a large country that should have a lot of influence and is a great strategic partner. And those enthusiasms are commonly frustrated. That is how Brazil is perceived. Not like an adversary. Certainly not perceived as a military threat.

ES: And why do you believe this frustration comes out? Is it because of the difference of understanding about sovereignty, going with UN agreement? What is the point?

RS: From Washington's perspective... It is my observation that people that don't know Brazil very well find themselves in positions in the State Department and in the bureaucracies in the US, but the State Department chiefly and somewhat in the Defense Department... They don't know Brazil very well but they have their advanced enough in their careers to be put in charge of a country portfolio, desk office, some position of influence with a possibility of advancing a program. They are given Brazil and that is exciting. They read a little about Brazil and they realize that Brazil is not a average South American country. It’s an important country, with huge economy, all these prospects, all this enthusiasm. And then they go to Brazil, they meets Brazilians. Brazilians tend to be very cordial and charming, to sound very cooperative. And there is a sense that things can really get done with Brazil, because there is so much possibilities in there, and so much competence and friendliness from the Brazilians. So they start working things bureaucratically to get things done. And then all of that effort that comes across in a person to person level and around the table with six Brazilians talking about what should be done hits the bureaucracy in both sides. And the Brazilian bureaucracy, like ours to some extent, is not designed to get things done immediately, and it is difficult to advance things in that. And they are told that Brazil is a little complicated, it takes time to work through this industrial group or "this is now being negotiated in Brasilia with this group of congressmen", and it needs time for the president or whoever, the minister for Foreign Affairs to talk with the president's people and get this to the congress. And that starts taking weeks, months and months. In the United States system, (People in) The State Department tend to have two or three year windows in their jobs. So they come in and say "I want to do something. Who can I do with? Brazil could be great. Can we do it within two years? Yes, let's get started now". The first six or eight months they organize their desks, they meet people. A year and they finally meet with the Brazilians and they think they get something done. So a year and half into their tenure, they think they have a program that is getting up and running with the Brazilians, but it starts to look like the Brazilians aren't going to be able to meet the deadlines they kind of informally agreed to. So they try to push the Brazilians. And then, of course, things of course happen in Brazil and these programs of Washington are never high up on the Brazilian political agenda. And so, I think under the Workers Party governments there has also been these pockets of resistance to any sort of program, which aren't immediately apparent to people that don't know Brazil very well. Even to some of those that know Brazil reasonably well. And so two years in they realize this program is probably not going to happen for another three or four years, it is held up in Congress... And they start to lose interest. And that is when they are frustrated. "I think I had a thing going on with Brazil but it really didn't advance". At the same time, Colombia can advance relatively speaking. Not everything, of course. But you can make more advances in Latin America in the smaller countries that are less bureaucratically complicated. A president’s decision, a foreign minister's decision and a very good visit with the business community can actually advance things more quickly. So then they will be more feeling like working with the Mexicans or the Colombians because at least they are getting to somewhere. There is a sense you are getting somewhere. While with Brazilians there is a sense that they don't really care and now that person that you met moved on and nothing came of it. So I think some of it is personal frustration within a short timeline because these US career pass means that people rotate (every) two or three years and with you can’t accomplish within two or three you sort of feel... you want to find something you can do in three years and Brazil is a hard place to get something done in this time. Maybe it is part of the Custo Brasil. I think in most countries it's probably the same. I think of India. When you talk with experienced diplomats that have been to many countries, (you hear that) it is very hard to get things done. I don't know why Brazil tends to excite ambitions more than other countries, and those ambitions become frustrated more typically.

 ES: This is interesting because I participated in a meeting with the guys in the US embassy in Brasilia, from the State Department or from the Navy, and the official of the Navy asked to me and Érico "What can we do to foster Navy to Navy relationships?". It was a couple of weeks after the espionage issue. I said "Well, now it is very hard. The moment is not good". But he was very enthusiastic. I believe he was this kind of professional. Probably he talked with people in the Navy and of the Defense ministry. It is very interesting your point. if could see in his face this kind of enthusiasm. Even in a bad moment, a few weeks after the WikiLeaks and the issue of spying communications of the president and Petrobras.

PS: Within the military relations is my observation that those kind of officers in Brazil, these cooperation officers, speaking on a day to day basis and speaking with Brazilians partner on their forces, tend to get a very positive (response) of the forces, the Navy even more than the Army. In general I have always heard "when they go to meetings and they are implementing a project, Brazilians are very cooperative" and the Brazilian officers with whom they work will say "We have great relations, we are advancing them and we want better relations. We just have to work through some of these politics. The politicians who [01:30:51]. And so they believe that. What they don’t understand is that the complications are more complicated, or have greater power of delaying things. I don't know. This is what Brazilian watchers in Washington deal with all the time "Why is Brazil so difficult?". Maybe it is because the impediments and the obstacles in the Brazilian system are somehow less apparent than here. it seems like here when you sit down with American officers, the navy, the military, probably the business too. I don’t know that. At least with the government and the military, Americans will be able to say "We can do this, we can't do that. Here is what we are going to do, because these other options are closed to us.". And maybe it is the case, I'm speculating and this is a good question to that kind of audience you were talking about, that Brazilian will tend to say "oh, we can think about that".

ES: And that means no.

RS: This is my experiment. "It can be a little complicated, but let me try". And it takes months and months to figure it out that those were nos. That it is not going to work. And so that is what I mean that the impediments aren’t really that much more difficult than ours, but Brazilians do not communicate them directly. And maybe the Brazilians also think there are more possibilities getting around and there really aren't. But I think that is part of it. I talk to those kinds of people you were describing and they say "we are doing this and this and this" and I say "that is really interesting. I am impressed you are doing all that. Does the Defense minister now you are doing that?". Obviously the Defense minister does know. They say "this is likely to happen". And I say "well, I’m surprised because I have read the defense minister comments and in my read you are probably not going to be able to do that. But go ahead and if they say you can... Who am I? But I would be surprised". And typically six months later, a year later it is "No, that never really advanced." They hear a lot of yes and they believe it. [01:33:12] in the last years they realize "Those were probably no’s".

ES:  And there is another problem in Brazil that is the financing, the problem of money in the defense realm. We have a budget for some projects, they start and after a year or two they are cut or restricted. All these ongoing projects of military modernization are being delayed because of the lack fo money. That is a problem. So it might hamper cooperation and a more operative capability of the Brazilian armed forces. And even in diplomacy, especially in Africa, we have opened a lot of embassies on Lula’s mandate but since Dilma government started many of these embassies don’t have a budget to work, to pay the bills, very simple problems.

RS: There is not a guaranteed funding in the way that, for whatever reason, the United States... Because our Congress is dysfunctional, obviously we are cutting budgets and [01:34:57] a lot of programs. But most programs in the State Department, embassies don’t tend to be cut unless it is really drastic. My explanation tends to be... I am a political scientist so I want to find some sort of invisible structure that determinate things. So my explanations tend to be: Brazil doesn’t takes the military seriously because it doesn’t feel any national security threat. So one of the first things to be cut it is going to be the military because they are not committed to it the way they are committed to anti-poverty programs, development programs, There is not a clear national demand that is liked to national security, despite of all that doctrinal language. If that were true, than in other areas of the relationship you would see less of this frustration. Perhaps in areas that are less contentious, where the alignment of Brazilian amd US interests is stronger. In investment. The government funded, sponsored programs for industrial cooperation. One interesting experiment for people like us, someday if we have time, would be to do a comparative assessment, a comparative analysis … interviewing some the officials that worked on that sphere, in the promotion of industrial cooperation, and maybe science and technology. Maybe there is much more cooperation and much less political resistance. And the military, defense sphere, to see if in another spheres they are “Oh the Brazilians are very easy to get along. We didn’t have much problems. It was just that we didn’t have any money". That would be interesting because I mostly know this from the security experience. It is easy to say “Oh, that is because Brazilians don’t really care". Which makes sense because I haven’t compared with some of these others sectors. That is my hypothesis.

ES: You believe there is more room for Brazil to operate in the regional system, from the perspective of the United States. Do you believe there is space for a regional hegemony in South America for Brazil? Do you believe in that perspective?

RS: That Brazil could be a hegemonic actor in South America?

ES: Yes.

RS: It could be, sure. But what Brazil would need to establish itself as a hegemonic actor is other countries wanting to be like Brazil. And other people wanting to live in Brazil and seeing Brazil as a role model. I don’t think that is nearly the case. Aside from the economic [01:37:52] Haitians, Bolivians that have are going to Brazil for work, which is part of it, my impression is that other South Americans and Latin Americans don’t see Brazil as a land of opportunity, equality, rights and justice as they do with the United States. But the Brazilians tend to use the term soft power. I don’t know what they mean. They mean something about being popular. People like Brazil because it has a pretty flag, the beaches and this kind of national image people around the world are charmed by. But I don’t really think that is soft power. Soft power is countries and people wanting to be like you. So the soft power of the United States is more that people around the world, especially in the 60’s, the 70’s, saw the United States as the place where democracy and human rights by and large were promoted. And it is proven. The strongest indication of that is, year after year, the tens of millions of people line in to come live in the United States and the violation of  US visas because people want to live here, people want to come here, including Brazilians. They see the legal system and the culture as more open, permissive and protective. That is what I think is soft power. So Brazil has a certain problems regarding that: corruption is one, equality (is another). We don’t have equality and we have less now than we used to. But somehow there is a mobility and there is a attractiveness to the US. The entrepreneurship and the possibilities of making money and living a secure life here, that there aren’t in other countries. Brazil would need to attend something like that. And I feel the same way about China. I mean, no one wants to live in China. This is a problem in seeing China as a great power. China can be a big economic power and it can have a regional navy, it can exert itself though threats, to its neighbors in particular. But in terms of a multipolar order... Does China offer a different view of human relations that is more attractive to people than liberal democracy? No, by a long shot. So, for Brazil to become a hegemonic power in that way it would need to become a beloved and respected, admired leader. Partially through diplomacy, partially because of its values. South Americans think less of Brazilian values and leadership than I do. They don’t see Brazil as a place to realize democracy any better than in most of their countries. It could reach that. I think the most exciting thing going on in Latin America today, in general, is the anti-corruption wave. Tremendously positive. Could have enormously positive economic and governmental implications for the future of these countries and Brazil is certainly in the middle of all that. That is the kind of impression countries need to have of Brazil, as a country that doesn’t allow such things as the Petrobras scandal at that scale.

ES:  And do you believe this ongoing crisis in Brazil… there are many crises: you have a foreign crisis, the downturn on the price of commodities; you have an economic crisis hitting strong this year and probably 2016 (as well); and a political crisis, you are probably following. Do you believe these ongoing three crisis will put an end to a trajectory of a rising Brazil? Just as the debt crisis in the 80’s put an end in the late 70’s rising Brazil?

RS: I would say like Japan. The debt crisis of the 80’s knocked Japan off the trajectory of becoming a global power… My short answer is no. I think commodities prices will rise again, including food prices. China in particular, I hope, and then the United States and Europe will… The United States is doing reasonably well now. China’s economy hopefully will ride its current slump for a few more months, a couple years, I don’t know, and when it comes out that will pull the commodities prices back up and South America will feel good again. And [01:43:17] Europe will be buying more South American... I think that will come back. That always tends to rise and fall. What it is important is that... It seems to me that over the 20th century these rise and falls, often times when the fall hit again, like in the 80's, the region was actually worse off than it was in the previous fall. And in the rise again, in the mid 90's, was not better off than it was in the 1970's. There were short term fluctuations but there wasn't a long term improvement. The argument is that today there are signs that most countries in South America, but not Venezuela, maybe not Argentina, certainly Brazil, are in a much better place than they were twenty years ago. Even throughout this entire crisis. The United States has economic crisis, as you know and we ride them out. We ride them out better than most countries, including China, which is my speculation. Brazil should as well. This crisis across Latin America is incomparable with the crisis of the early 90's or 1998, 1999 when they ran into the IMF for cash and austerity measures. There will be austerity, there will be cut backs. But that is the kind of thing capitalist democracies have to do to manage these times in Keynesian fashion. So I think certainly Brazil will come back and when its economy surges again it will gain be a country with great prospects. It has a high ceiling, as you say about baseball prospects. It can be a great country, a very prosperous country. It will likely do if it gets its domestic politics right. And in many ways, its domestic politics and its social programs are much better off than it was ten or fifteen years ago in addressing inequality, poverty, education. We don't need to start talking about the challenges Brazil faces. Brazil faces a lot of problems to build its human capital, in particular, and its infrastructure. So does the United States. The US needs massive infrastructure investment and much better education in order to continue to prosper. I hope both countries find their way to do so. Is it assured? No, but the prospects are good. And certainly the United States have shown to be able to do that in the past. I'm afraid for our political dysfunction these days. Our politics are much uglier than they have been in decades. Uglier is not a good word. They are much less functional. So we are not able to address problems because our congressional system is completely stuck. But I think Brazil has good times ahead. So the important thing, let's say, of the corruption scandal is that there is a high assume that the Brazilian public is as impressed as I am with these [01:46:31]. The prosecutors in Brazil that are actually pulling in. And a legal system that is broadly able to manage this high level corruption cases and put top politicians in jail. Same in Guatemala, potentially in Honduras. That is wonderful in terms of government and improving at least the prospective, the expectation of the rule of law on that country. That doesn't mean that all police systems are fixed, not any more than does in the United States. We went through decades and decades of political development where we had deeply corrupt politics at the highest level etc. And those tended to be cleaned out, but it took decades. So these are all part of a very positive trajectory for the region, undeniably. And that's why I think there is more optimism for Brazil in Washington then there was before Lula. It's hard to say because Cardoso was much loved. But in the early 90's there was the whole "Brazil is the country of tomorrow and always will be". I think that is less of a acute cliché now. It aged. People are better informed and are convinced that Brazil has made certain strides that are very important over the last four, five governments. The Dilma political crisis is fun to watch from outside. They say "It is a crisis. What will happen? Will she stay or go?”. But in most people minds Brazil's democracy is going to ride that out, one way or another, and survive as a functioning constitutionally driven democracy with certain transitions occurring. There is no sense of a coup or that anything like that is going to happen. And I think that is enormously positive historically.

ES: Thank you very much, Ralph. It was a wonderful conversation, a wonderful interview.

RS: It feels good to talk about it.